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I. INTRODUCTION
Unquestionably, part of the suburban devotion to home rule is the fear
that the white noose around the growing Black populations of the central
cities might be loosened, if the municipalities were to lose their 'home
rule' control over such services as zoning and rent or housing subsidies.1
One of the agonizing paradoxes of all too many contemporary reform
ventures is that by the time they achieve formal success, be it legislative
adoption or judicial recognition, they are already outdated solutions to
past problems. In fact, the political consensus traditionally necessary for
enacting legislative reforms is often aided by those who self-consciously
seek to stem the tide of more profound, and hence more disturbing, change.
Thus, it frequently happens that the proposal which is adopted today as
the hopeful solution to yesterday's problem becomes one of the causes of
tomorrow's discontent. Conspiratorial and political machinations aside,
the technological burden of accounting for the myriad of facts and policies
which must be considered in undertaking any conscious program for social
change makes it a wonder that we "muddle through" as well as we do;
some analysts have suggested that reform on the grand scale is now an
anachronism.2
Current concern with the appropriate scope of home rule power over
land use controls presents an example of two contemporary reform move-
ments which have become "part of the problem" rather than the means of
providing solutions to the housing needs of low and moderate income
families in and about our large urban centers. Ohio is not exempt from
this development, nor is it an uniquely Ohio problem. Therefore, in addi-
tion to delineating the circumstances peculiar to the Ohio context, it will
be fitting to consider developments in other jurisdictions. Let us begin
with a brief sketch of the origins and goals of the two reform movements
whose convergence has produced what the Douglas Commission has called
"the white suburban noose around the inner city .... ,,3
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1 W. D. HEISEL AND I. 0. HESSLER, STATE GOVERNMENT FOR OUR TMS, A REPORT TO
TH STEPHAN H. WILDER FOUNDATION 49 (1970).2 Hirschman and Lindblom, Economic Development, Research and Dcvelopment, Policy
faking: Some Converging Views, 7 BEHAvIoRAL ScIENcE 211, 215-16 (1962).
3 BUILDING THE AzMRIcAN CITy, THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COmMISSION ON
URBAN PROBLEMS TO THE CONGRESS AND TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.
Doc. No. 91-34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1968).
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II. THE HOME RULE REFORM MOVEMENT
In order to understand the controversy over and enthusiasm for the
establishment of home rule, the relationship between state government and
local governments must be understood. In contrast to the federal system
in which the states have plenary sovereignty except in so far as expressly
limited by the United States Constitution, local governments have no in-
herent sovereign powers; they are deemed to be the creatures of the state
government and enjoy only those powers delegated by the state constitu-
tion or legislative act. While there have been occasional assertions of "an
inherent right of local self-government," these have gained only limited
acceptance by courts or theorists,4 and the classic statement of municipal
subordination found in Dillon's Rule expresses clearly the dominant, if
not universally accepted, view."
Of course, the formal subordination of local government to the state
does not mean that, in practice, municipal corporations did not enjoy con-
siderable independence even before the establishment of home rule; inertia,
the pattern of diffuse settlement of cities within the States, and indiffer-
ence have always contributed to a sizable amount of local independence.
Even so the formal power relations proved vexing to local communities
when state legislatures found it in their interest to intervene in local affairs
and to attempt to control, on occasion, even the most minute details of
municipal government. State intervention in the affairs of local communi.
ties no doubt often reflected the pursuit of lofty goals such as establishing
uniform levels of municipal services throughout the state, making avail-
able the efficiency and expertise of centralized planning and regulation,
and providing protection against local political skulduggery, but this far-
4 For an early exposition of the thesis that there is an inherent and traditional right of local
self-government, see Judge Cooley's opinion in People cx rel. LeRoy v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44,
94-108 (1871). Apparently Michigan no longer offers a hospitable climate for this doctrine.
See Highland Park v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 364 Mich. 508, 111 N.W.2d
797 (1961). Additional arguments in support of the proposition wll be found in Eaton, Tho
Right to Local Self-Government, 13 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1900), and in McQuillan, 35 AM.
L. REV. 510 (1901); in rebuttal, see McBain, The Doctrine of an Inherent Right of Local Self.
Government, 16 COLum. L. REv. 190 (1916).
A recent opinion of the Nebraska supreme court, in a case involving the claim that extra.
territorial zoning should be declared void because the people subject to the zoning restrictions
had no voice in the selection of the city officials who enacted the ordinance stated that "[sluch
persons . . . have neither a constitutional nor inherent right tD local self.government."
Schlientz v. North Platte, 172 Neb. 477, 490, 110 N.W.2d 58, 66 (1961).
5No article dealing with any aspect of home rule can escape a statement of Dillon's Rule:
A municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers, and no
others: first, those granted in express words; second, those necess-.rily or fairly implied
in or incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those es:ential to the accom-
plishment of the declared objects and purposes of the corporation,-not simply con-
venient, but indispensable.
1 DILLON, MUNICIPAL Com'otATONS § 237, at 449 (5th ed. 1911).
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reaching power apparently was also seen as a source of personal profit by
some state officials and this was particularly aggravating.'
The home rule reform movement had additional strings to its bow:
not only would municipal home rule serve as a welcome antidote to the
perceived prodigious corruption at the distant state house, but it also would
free legislators from the time-consuming burdens of local affairs, thus mak-
ing it possible for them to confront the rapidly increasing list of problems
posed by a developing industrial society. Attention to the affairs of local
government, it was argued, accomplished little of benefit to the citizenry
and diverted the state legislature's energy and focus away from the con-
pelling need to establish the mechanism for regulating irresponsible busi-
ness practices, providing for industrial peace and safety, and similar sig.
nificant obligations. Thus, the movement toward establishing home rule
shared values in common with the establishment of general laws of in-
corporation and the imposition of restrictions upon local or special legis-
lation.
Advocates of municipal home rule have consistently capitalized upon
the persistent theme of political self-determination found in American
political theory and rhetoric, starting with the debates on the establishment
of the federal government, through the development of a system of self-
government for America's domestic colonial empire,7 down to the current
fascination with municipal decentralization.8 After all, we all know that
we can do a better job regulating our own affairs than those in Washing-
ton, Sacramento, Albany, or even Columbus; and even if we can't, since we
live with the mistakes of governmental folly, only local control offers any
significant manner of local redress for local grievances. Statewide officials,
even in situations where they have control over affairs in local communi-
ties, are seldom elected on the basis of their record with respect to local
affairs, nor do they campaign on what are distinctly local issues.
Two mechanisms for establishing home rule authority have been tradi-
6 McBain reports the following description of practices found prevalent in the state of New
York:
Cities were compelled by the legislature to buy lands for parks and places because the
owners wished to sell them: compelled to grade, pave, and sewer streets without in-
habitants, and for no other purpose than to award corrupt contracts for the work...
laws were enacted abolishing one office and creating another with the same duties,
in order to transfer official emoluments from one man to another, and laws to change
the function of officers with a view only to a new distribution of patronage, and to
lengthen the terms of offices, for no other purpose than to retain in place officers
who could not otherwise be elected or appointed.
H. L MCBAIn, THE LAW AND PRACnCE OF MUNICaPAL HOME RULE 9 (1916). We must
remember that the last quarter of the 19th century, with its prodigious increase in population
and commensurate growth in cities has been characterized by Vernon Parrington as the period
of the "great national barbeque."
7 Conventional nomenclature refers to "the establishment of territorial government," e.g.,
in the Northwest Territory.
8 See, e.g., Babcock and Bosselman, Citizen Participation: A Suburban Suggestion for the
Central City, 32 LAW AND CoNTP p. PRoB. 220 (1967)..
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tionally utilized: (1) A constitutional limitation upon the power of the
state legislature to act in regard to municipal affair;; and (2) a delegation
of authority to municipalities to act in matters of local affairs without the
need for specific prior legislative approval. While there may be instances
when it is appropriate to prohibit state intervention and to grant blanket
authority to local governments to act without prior and specific legislative
authorization, there are many instances in which the grant of local initia-
tive is more properly subject to the ultimate powers of the state to act with
controlling authority when it chooses to do so. Thus, those who advocate
an expansion of home rule power to achieve local initiative by means of
a broad and generalized delegation of authority from the state frequently
accept a limitation on this initiative if and when it conflicts with an exer-
cise of state power.9
Ohio adopted its home rule amendment in 1912 and a detailed analysis
and exposition of the convention proceedings pertaining to home rule are
presented in Dean Fordham's article which appeared in a previous issue
of this journal and will not be re-examined here, although we shall later
return to some of the specifics of the Ohio home rule provisions.Y0
III. THE ZONING REFORM MOVEMENT
The institution of private property has consistently been a basic tenet of
"the American way of life," but few of that sacred institutions's most
ardent supporters are prepared to endorse Blackstone's prescription that
"the regard of the law for private property is so great that it will not au-
thorize the least violation of it; no, not even for the general good of the
whole community.""
The history of the common law is replete with examples of the state's
intervention to regulate the use of private property in the interest of com-
munity well-being. For example, modern building codes find their ante-
cedence in such Seventeenth Century English legislation as that statute
adopted after the great fire of London which set forth the "rules and
orders of building."' 2
Moreover the common law of nuisance has consistently imposed re-
straints upon land owners to protect the rights of both their immediate
neighbors and the general public from unreasonable uses of private prop-
erty. Based upon these precedents we are not surprised to learn that as
early as 1799 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania sustained an ordinance
9 For a discussion of the virtues of a broad grant of municipal initiative see Sandalow, Tho
Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV. 643,
652-658 (1964).
0 Fordham and Asher, Home Rule Powers in Theory and Practice, 9 OHIo ST. L,J. 18
(1948).
11 1 W. BLAcKsToNE, CoMMENTARIEs ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 139 (Jones, ed, 1916).
12An Act for Rebuilding the City of London, 19 Car. 2, c. 3 (1666).
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which prohibited the construction of wooden buildings in areas of heavy
concentration within the city of Philadelphia,"3 and that the United States
Supreme Court upheld municipally imposed limitations on the height of
buildings in Boston, 4 and also upheld ordinances banning commercial
livery stables and the manufacture of bricks in urban areas.15
The use of individual ordinances, each aimed at a specific and narrowly
enumerated prohibition, proved to be an inefficient device for controlling
the chaotic character of America's developing urban centers, and, in 1916,
New York City's Board of Estimate adopted the first comprehensive at-
tempt at regulating urban growth and land use patterns. The New York
Building Zone Resolution was addressed to the problems of safety from
fire, provision of adequate light and air for dwelling users and the main-
tenance of convenient access to buildings, and was enacted under the au-
thority of the police power to provide for the general welfare, public
health and public safety. Separate districts were provided for residential
and business uses, with a third district left for unrestricted use. These
districts were designated on a map in order to provide advance notice to
potential developers, thus alleviating much of the unpredictibility of tradi-
tional nuisance law. Height restrictions and limitations on maximum lot
coverage were applied throughout the city. When, in 1920, the New York
Court of Appeals upheld the building zone resolution 0 the zoning reform
movement received a significant send off. Litigation which arose in Ohio
provided the imprimatur of the United States Supreme Court in 1926 when
Mr. Justice Sutherland wrote the majority opinion sustaining the zoning
ordinance of the Village of Euclid which, among other things, banned
apartment buildings from single family residential districts, putting to rest
the contention that such comprehensive regulations violated federal stand-
ards of due process by unduly restricting the rights of property owners17
The ameliorative contribution of zoning to the threatening conditions
of the urban life is set forth by the court in language typical of the prose-
lytizers of the zoning reform movement:
[it] will make it easier to provide fire apparatus suitable for the char-
acter and intensity of the development in each section; ... it will increase
the safety and security of home life; greatly tend to prevent street acci-
dents, especially to children, by reducing the traffic and resulting confusion
in residential sections; decrease noise and other conditions which produce
13 Respublica v. Philip Urban Duquer, 2 Yeates 493 (1799).
14 Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909).
'
15 Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394
(1915).
16 Lincoln Trust Co. v. The Williams Bldg. Corp., 229 N. Y. 313, 128 N.. 209 (1920).
17Eudid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). A strong reliance upon the analogy
with the nuisance doctrine permeated the opinion, and added significantly to our understanding
of that murky field, e.g.: "A nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place,-like a
pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard." Id. at 388.
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or intensify nervous disorders; preserve a more favorable environment in
in which to rear children .... 18
With respect to the particular question of excluding apartment houses
from single-family residential districts, the court waxed rhapsodically that
... very often the apartment house is a mere parasite .. . interfering by
[its] height and bulk with the free circulation of air nd monopolizing the
rays of the sun which otherwise would fall upon the smaller homes, and
bringing, as [its] necessary accompaniments, the disturbing noises inci-
dent to increased traffic and business ... thus detracting from [its] safety
and depriving children of the privilege of quiet and open spaces for
play .... 19
Thus, the emphasis in the court's opinion, as in the reform literature of
the day, stressed the humanistic goals of endowing urban life with the
virtues of rural living-open spaces, freedom from noise and congestion,
and a safe place for children to play. Little stress was placed upon the
utility of zoning as a means of stabilizing and preserving property values
in developing areas. However, this was a major theme in the numerous
tracts, and public presentations of the advocates of zoning, especially when
confronting business and real estate groups understandably suspicious of
expanding the authority of the state to regulate the use of private prop-
erty, a practice which sounded mildly socialistic to some.
Aided by a favorable decision in the Euclid case and with the official
endorsement of the United States Department of Commerce, the zoning
reformers virtually blanketed the countryside in the next two decades, to
the point where the city of Houston, Texas, remains the single holdout
among sizeable American cities from the persuasiveness of the reformers'
arguments.20
Two words of caution, if not apprehension, attended the reformers'
victory in the Euclid case. Judge Westenhaver made a prescient observa-
tion in the trial court decision in Euclid when he said that
the result to be accomplished is to classify the population and segregate
them according to their income or situation in life. The true reason why
some persons .. .live in a single-family dwelling and others .. .in an
apartment .. .is primarily economic. It is a matter of income and
wealth .... 21
Because the ordinance in question would further such "class tendencies"
and otherwise deprived the plaintiff of property without just compensation,
Judge Westenhaver declared the ordinance null and void.
While the United States Supreme Court did not appear particularly
18d. at 394.
l9Id.
20 The early history of the zoning reform movement is told iii ,reat detail and with consid-
erable style in S. I. TOLL, ZONED A ERIcAN (1969).
21 Ambler Realty Co. v. Euclid, 297 F. 307,316 (N.D. Ohio 1924).
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concerned about the tendency of zoning to encourage economic segrega-
tion, it did acknowledge the possibility that regulations enacted by the Vil-
lage of Euclid, while serving the best interests of Euclidians, might do so
at the expense of persons in surrounding communities. The court explicit-
ly recognized "the possibility of cases where the general public interest
would so far outweigh the interest of the municipality that the municipal-
ity would not be allowed to stand in the way." 22
Thus, it is clear that at the baptism, if not the birth, it was apparent
that the zoning reform movement had within it the potential for elitist
and isolationist mischief. Now that zoning has reached middle age, it has
come under increasing attack as being antithetical to democratic values.
Because zoning in Ohio, as in all other states with the single exception of
Hawaii, is administered primarily at the local level, we are brought full
circle again to a consideration of home rule. However, before proceeding
further let us examine, in brief, the accusation that the zoning power is
used to achieve economic segregation in our communities.
IV. EXCLUSIONARY ZONING:2 MEANS AND ENDS
Exclusionary zoning serves several purposes in the eyes of its supporters,
some perhaps more ethically justifiable than others. No doubt, there are
those who seek to keep "their" community racially homogeneous and see
all potential moderate and low income neighbors as either black, or other-
wise racially tainted. Having lost the civil rights fight in the legislative
halls and in the courtrooms at state and national levels, they now take re-
course in whatever local power they may conveniently misuse. Another
group of supporters of exclusionary zoning, while not racially bigoted,
seek to avoid unnecessary contact with members of a "lower" socio-eco-
nomic class. Still another reason for embracing exclusionary zoning is that
of fiscal self-interest, founded on the belief that apartments, mobile home
parks, duplexes and even smaller single family dwellings do not pay their
own way, i.e. these living arrangements do not provide sufficient real prop-
erty tax revenues to balance out the tax-consuming capacities of their in-
habitants. If the residences of low and moderate income families do not
produce sufficient revenue to pay the costs of providing schools, sanitary
facilities, recreation and fire and police protection, then the inevitable result
is that the community's more affluent members will have to absorb the bur-
den, or alternatively, see the quality of services rendered diminished. None
of the aforementioned positions necessarily presupposes misanthropy or
animus toward those excluded. It may reflect nothing more than a disin-
22Eudid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390 (1926).
2 3 The terminology employed often reflects the point of view of the speaker. The synonym
"snob zoning' probably reflects the sense of indignation felt by some critics of present practices,
while "fiscal zoning" better fits the apologist's lexicon.
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clination to shoulder additional economic burdens or experience unwanted
social trauma.
From the perspective of those barred from a community by exclusionary
zoning practices, the motives or intentions behind the municipal regulations
are, for practical purposes, irrelevant. Similarly, in terms of the impact
upon the communities in which the excluded are presently living, or those
in which they ultimately settle, is concerned, again motives are of minor
significance. The harm to the low or middle income family which is effec-
tively excluded may take several forms. It may mean that suitable employ-
ment is put beyond the geographic reach of a wage earner, or at least that
it will require an excessive investment in time and money traveling to
work.2 4 In terms of the stated goals of the zoning reformers, the excluded
low and middle income family may be deprived of suitable amenities such
as open space, fresh air and sunlight, recreational facilities, and freedom
from the acute pressures of high density living. If the family excluded
is black or a member of another racial minority, then another consequence
will be that of impeding attempts at overcoming racial segregation and iso-
lation, an cventuality which may have particularly significant impacts upon
educational patterns and opportunities for social mobility.
Exclusionary zoning practices may inflict costs upon neighboring com-
munities as well as upon the particular individuals excluded. If it is true
that low and moderate income families do not generate sufficient real
estate tax revenues to pay the costs of the services they consume, then the
exclusionary practices of one community are tantamount to imposing a tax
upon the community which is compelled, by want of any alternative, to
serve as the host for low and moderate income families. There may be
instances when, due to the presence of a large amount of tax-producing
industrial or commercial property, a community is well able to afford the
cost of large numbers of low and middle income families settling within
its borders, but under the present system such a result is most likely mere
happenstance. Additionally, if racially integrated neighborhoods25 are de-
sirable, or at least ought to be obtainable, then to the extent that exclu-
sionary practices impede their establishment, the entire social system suffers.
Similarly, if overcrowding or the other inadequacies of blighted older
neighborhoods sap the vigor and health of the poor, then additional costs
are imposed upon society at large. Quite clearly what may appear to be
good for an exclusive suburban community may not serve the needs of
the total body politic.
Given a goal of excluding low and moderate income families, the avail-
able techniques are legion. For example, there is the practice of zoning
24 As more and more factories and businesses relocate in suburban communities this has
become an increasing problem, and one exacerbated by the sorry state of public transportation
in most communities.
25 Such neighborhoods are most likely to produce racially integrated schools without busing.
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residential districts exclusively for single family homes and excluding all
duplexes, apartments and mobile homes. Having banned outright the less
expensive housing options, a community might then increase the costs of
single-family houses by such means as establishing excessive minimum lot
sizes, minimum house sizes, and even minimum prices for housing. Of
course zoning is not the only exclusionary technique available to those in-
tent upon such a goal, and subdivision regulations may also be manipu-
lated to increase the cost of housing beyond the means of moderate and
low income families. This is certainly the consequence of loading the cost
of underground utilities, school and recreational sites, sewer and drainage
facilities, and roads and sidewalks onto the subdivision developer who
quite naturally will attempt to pass these costs on to the ultimate consumer.
The common technique of using variances and zoning amendments for
leverage serves to further frustrate the development of low and moderate
income housing projects.26
V. EXCLUSIONARY ZONING: RESPONSES AND REMEDIES
What is "the answer" to exclusionary zoning? The first step is frank
recognition of the existence of a problem T From that point on paths
diverge depending upon the circumstances. For example, in states in
which the power to zone rests solely upon a legislative delegation from
the state to the local community, the state legislature has it within its
power, by enacting suitable amendments to the state's zoning enabling act,
to develop countervailing forces to the tendencies of the local govern-
ments to enact exclusionary provisions. A state might provide for an ad-
ministrative appeals agency to which claims of exclusionary zoning might
be taken and which is vested with the authority to override local zoning
restrictions in appropriate cases.28 Another alternative open to the state
legislature is to amend the zoning enabling act and include specific pre-
scriptions concerning the nature of the "general welfare" to be served un-
der the delegated authority, thus emphasizing the obligation of each local
community to exercise self-restraint when its conduct externalizes costs;
26 There is a vast body of literature which has sprung up in the last several years describing
and analyzing the techniques of exclusionary zoning. See, e.g., Sager, Tight Little Islands: Ex-
clusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767 (1969); BROOKS,
EXCLUSIONARY ZONING (American Society of Planning Officials, Planning Advisory Service,
1970); Symposium: Exclusionary Zoning, 22 Sy. . RLRV. 465-536 (1971). Norman Williams
raised the issue fifteen years before it became fashionable in Williams, Planning Law and Demo-
cratic Living, 20 LAw AND CONTEIP. PROB. 317 (1955).
27 Accepting Professor Banfield's plea to avoid "semantic confusion," I still opt for "prob-
lem" rather than describing exclusionary zoning as a matter of mere "comfort, convenience,
amenity, and business advantage." See E. C. BANFiBLD, THE UNHEAvIENLY CM, at 4 (19701.
28 This is essentially the technique adopted in Massachusetts. See Note, Snob Zoning: Dc-
velopments in Massachusetts and New Jersey, 7 HARV. J. LEGIS. 246 (1970).
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when local communities fail to exercise suitable restraint, the state judiciary
must be relied upon to police the system.2
Another approach, available at the state level, is modeled after the
voluntary system adopted by the Miami Valley Regional Planning Com-
mission's Housing Distribution Plan,30 an unusual program for the impo-
sition of quotas for the construction of new housing for low and moderate
income based upon a statistically derived "fair share" formula. This ap-
proach emphasizes the essential equity of distributing the indirect costs of
subsidizing low and moderate income families throughout a region or a
state. As a voluntary venture, it is based upon the optimistic assumption
that we are a people of good will, each willing to do his share so long as
there is an assurance that one's neighbor will also assume a fair share of
the burdens of society. The advantage of a housing distribution plan over
the two "alternatives previously mentioned is that, ,:ather than responding
to individual complaints on an ad hoc basis, this system anticipates housing
needs and plans for their fulfillment on a comprehensive and systematic
basis. In states in which zoning authority is exercised under a legislatively
delegated home rule power, such a fair share distribution plan could be
imposed upon local communities and administered through either a state
agency or regional agencies.
A fourth alternative is exemplified by the New York State Urban De-
velopment Corporation which has the authority to build needed housing
in local communities and is immune from local zoning regulations. But
while it may possess the same potential for planning that a housing distri-
bution plan has, there are fewer guarantees that the agency apply an equity
principle in selecting communities in which it actually constructs low and
moderate income housing. Moreover, it is a highly centralized operation,
and while it could be organized and operated on a regional basis, the one
model in existence has not followed that pattern.
Taking a somewhat narrower focus one can conceive of a state imposing
"an off7-site housing requirement" on the developers of large-scale indus-
trial enterprise in suburban communities similar to the traditional imposi-
tion of off-street parking requirements on those who develop commercial
and industrial uses. This notion also employs an equity principle based on
the belief that if a business enterprise finds it profitable to locate in a sub-
urban community, then it ought to carry the responsibility of providing
housing sites for its workers rather than leaving them as a perpetual bur-
den to a neighboring community, which does not obtain the benefits of the
29 One author has suggested that the judiciary take the lead in so construing delegatcd au-
thority, even without legislative clarification. See Note, Removing the Bar of Exclusionary Zon-
ing to a Decent Home, 32 OHio ST. LJ. 373 (1971).
3 0 Bertsch and Shafor, A Regional Housing Plan: The Miami Valley Regional Plannihg
Commission Experience, 1 PLANNERS NOTEaBOOK (American Ikstitute of Planning, 1971);
Craig, The Dayton Area's 'Fair Share' Housing Plan, CiTy (Jan./Feb., 1972).
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newly created industrial tax base. An alternative analogy which would
support this kind of legislative imposition is the requirement that subdi-
visions dedicate land to be used for meeting educational and recreational
needs of the subdivision's residents.
As a final alternative, we should not fail to notice the potential conse-
quence of recent litigation challenging the reliance upon the local real
property tax base for financing public education. To the extent that fiscal
considerations make exclusionary zoning a natural result of a community's
perceived self-interest, then shifting the cost of education, the single largest
cost factor of local government, to a regional or statewide basis should
ease the pressure to exclude low and moderate income families. It is too
early to say with any certainty just what the legislative response will be to
the Serrano3 type decisions, but they may lend an unanticipated assistance
to those attempting to crack the exclusionary barriers surrounding so many
suburbs.
Turning now to the more frequently encountered stance at the state
capitol, i.e. either hostility or indifference to state action to overcome ex-
clusionary zoning,32 the natural alternative is recourse to litigation. A
substantial amount of litigation has occurred in the past five years, much
of it either assisted or sanctioned by such organizations as the Suburban
Action Institute, the National Committee Against Discrimination in Hous-
ing, and the NAACP's Legal Defense Fund. 3
No attempt to review this litigation will be undertaken here. The
litigation has proceeded on a wide variety of theories, ranging from asser-
tions that exclusionary zoning aids and abets both racial and economic
segregation in violation of the fourteenth amendment of the United States
Constitution, to the more mundane grounds on which so many zoning
ordinances are attacked-that they impose unreasonable and confiscatory
burdens upon the land owners whose rights of private property are in-
fringed upon. In this latter instance we frequently see the interest of the
civil rights advocate and the housing entrepreneur coincide, an unusual if
not unwelcome occurrence. Additionally, the Serrano decision 4 has en-
couraged attacks upon the notion that the state may constitutionally dele-
gate authority to local communities to act in their own self-interest at the
expense of the interest of the "general welfare." Dating back to Mr. Jus-
tice Sutherland's admonition in the Euclid case that there were instances
when the local community had to give way to the needs of the broader
community, Serrano suggests that claims of areal equal protection may
31 Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 478 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
3 2This should not be an unexpected response insofar as suburbanites tend to exert a steadily
increasing influence in state legislative chambers.
33The law review literature on this litigation is voluminous, and the interested reader is
urged to consult the Index to Legal Periodicals under "zoning!' or "constitutional law."
34 Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
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offer a useful leverage point for combating exclusionary zoning practices
by local governments.
VI. HOME RULE AND LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY TO COMBAT
EXCLUSIONARY ZONING IN OHIO
In states in which the home rule power is strictly the creation of the
legislature, abuse in the exercise of delegated authority is subject to cor-
rection at the legislature's pleasure. All that is needed is the appropriate
legislative majority and a wise choice of remedy. In Ohio the situation is
somewhat more complicated due to the constitutional basis upon which the
home rule power of municipalities stands. The very act of including a
provision on home rule in the constitution presupposes a commitment to
impose some limitation upon state legislative interference with local self-
determination. This is entirely consistent with the history of the home
rule movement as previously described.
An examination of the language in which Ohio's home rule provision
is cast, as well as the records of the constitutional convention of 1912, "
indicates that something less than total local autonomy was intended.
With respect to "local police, sanitary and other similar regulations," § 3
of art. 18 of the Ohio constitution expressly imposes the limitation that
such local enactments not be in "conflict with general laws" and also con-
fines enforcement of such ordinances to the municipalities' "limits."
On the other hand, the grant of "all powers of local self government"
is not so conditioned, and in this province it would appear that municipali-
ties have constitutional sovereignty and independence from legislative
power."'
Given the language of § 3, art. 18, of the Ohio constitution and the
case law interpreting it, would it be constitutionally permissible for the
Ohio General Assembly to assert itself in an attempt to curb the exclusion-
ary tendencies of local zoning regulations ?7 While the answer to this ques-
tion is not altogether clear, there is substantial reason to believe that the
General Assembly does possess adequate power at this time and that art.
3 5 Fordham and Asher, Home Rule Powers in Theory and Practice, 9 OHIO Sr. LJ. 18
(1948) offers a summary of the pertinant portions of the massive two volume work, PROC1IED-
INGS AND DEBATES OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, with respect to the question
of home rule.
30 The case law has drawn distinctions between municipalities which have adopted a home
rule charter and those which have no, and insofar as municipalities which have not adopted
home rule charters are concerned, between matters of "procedure" and "substance" insofar as
the grant of "powers of local self government" confers an immunity from state intervention.
The history of these distinctions as well as the current status of the law is discussed exhaustively
in Vaubel, Municipal Corporations and the Police Power in Ohio, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 29 (1968)
and Vaubel, Of Concern to Painesville-or Only to the State: Homo Rule in the Context of
Utilities Regulation, 33 OHIo ST. LJ. 257 (1972); and Duffey, Non-Charter Municipalitis::
Local Self Government, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 304 (1960).
27 For purposes of this discussion we may assume that any one of the aforementioned rem-
edies are contemplated. See text at notes 29-32, supra.
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18, § 3 does not impose a constitutional bar to enacting remedial legisla-
tion. Let us examine this question in greater detail. If a municipality's
zoning regulations were adopted under the clause of art. 18, § 3, which
confers the power "to adopt and enforce within their limits such local
police, sanitary and other similar regulations," then clearly the proviso
that such police power regulations not be "in conflict with general laws"
of § 3 recognizes the overriding power of the state. In short, if zoning is
an exercise of the police power,"' then the state may combat local exclu-
sionary practices by enacting "general laws" dealing with the problem.
Thus, the state itself might enact and administer zoning regulations en-
tirely as a state function, although the detail and specificity of such regu-
lations suggest that this approach is somewhat unlikely, if not impossible,
in Ohio.39
While leaving the initial responsibility for laying out zoning districts
and establishing standards and criteria to the local community, the state
might assume an active role as a "super appeals board" to adjudicate ad-
ministratively contentions that local zoning authority is being used in an
exclusionary fashion. Similarly, the state might mandate a housing dis-
tribution plan or adopt a system of statewide licensing for all develop-
ments or projects over a designated size, alternatives clearly within the
realm of practicality at the administrative level. One example of state
intervention under the police power which has deprived local communities
of some of their regulatory powers is exemplified by Ohio Revised Code§§ 3733.01 et seq., which provide for the licensing of house trailor parks
by the state and which have been held by the Ohio Supreme Court to pre-
clude local licensing requirements by municipalities.40
Even if we proceed on the theory that municipal zoning is an exercise
of municipal police power, there is apparently one limitation on state in-
tervention and that derives from the specialized meaning given by the
Ohio supreme court to the phrase "general laws" appearing in art. 18, § 3.
West Jefferson v. Robinson41 precludes a legislative enactment which
would prohibit municipalities from requiring a minimum house size or a
minimum lot size or other similar prohibitions upon the exercise of mu-
nicipal power. In order for a state statute to supercede local regulation it
must be "a general law" and in Ohio this has taken on a very special-
ized and somewhat limited meaning. As stated by Justice Taft in West Jef-
ferson, the words "general laws" as set forth in § 3, art. 18, of the Ohio
38 Ohio cases use "police power" in both a generic sense, in the same way the concept is em-
ployed generally in other jurisdictions, and in a more limited sense, in reference to the home
rule power granted by the second clause of art. 18, § 3.
39Tuber v. Perkins, 6 Ohio St. 2d 155, 157, 216 N.-2d 877, 879 (1966): "zoning is
peculiarly a local problem, impracticable of solution on a state-wide basis.
40 Anderson v. Brown, 13 Ohio Sr. 2d 53,233 N.F.2d 584 (1968).
41 1 Ohio St. 2d 113,205 N.E.2d 382 (1965).
1972,]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL[
constitution means statutes setting forth police, sanitary or other similar
regulations and not statutes which purport only to grant or to limit the
legislative powers of municipal corporations to adopt or enforce police,
sanitary or other similar regulations. Thus merely prescribing limitations
upon municipal power will not suffice; what is needed are specific rules of
conduct applicable to and enforceable against citizens of the state.42 Given
an understanding of the West Jefferson requirement, we have most likely
a limitation on the form which remedial legislation must take rather than
any significant diminution of its substantive scope.
While West Jefferson may be brushed aside as a minor problem, there
is substantial doubt as to the validity of the underlying premise of the
foregoing exposition; to the extent that the matter has been dealt with by
the Ohio Supreme Court, zoning has not been treated as if it were a "po-
lice power" but rather as a "power of local self-government." The lead-
ing case which identifies the power to zone as an exercise of "the power
of local self-government" is iMorris v. Roseman.43  While not included
in the syllabus, Justice Zimmerman's opinion proceeds on the premise that
zoning is an exercise of "the power of local self government" and cites
an earlier case, Pritz v. Mlesser44 in support of his assumption. To the ex-
tent that the entire home rule movement in general, and the history of the
movement in Ohio in particular, reflected a deep felt determination to re-
move from state control matters of municipal management and adminis-
tration, then this grant of exclusive authority to the municipality is not
entirely surprising. Moreover, to the extent that "powers of local self-
government" are seen as operating upon local "housekeeping" procedures,
there is substantially less danger in entrusting this power, regulated only
by state and constitutional grants of individual freedom, to the munici-
pality. In any case, it is fair to say that while the evidence is scanty, the
Ohio Supreme Court, in the few instances when it has touched upon the
matter, has treated zoning as a power of local self-government and there-
fore exempt from the conflict clause of art. 18, § 3.
VII. COMING TO GRIPS WITH EXTERNALITIES: THE
STATEWIDE CONCERN DOCTRINE
The scope of the exclusive grant of power to municipalities over mat-
ters of "local self-government" depends upon the definition given to the
operative terms "powers of local self-government." Once the subject is
classified as one of those "powers," we know that the legislature is pre-
42 Some doubt about the current vitality of the Vest Jefferson definition of "general laws"
is raised by Justice Taft's concurring opinion in Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Painesville,
15 Ohio St. 2d 125, 132-33, 239 N.E.2d 75, 79-80 (1968).
43 162 Ohio St. 447, 123 N.E.2d 419 (1954).
44 112 Ohio St. 628, 149 N.E. 30 (1925).
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cluded from intervening, but the constitutional language itself does not
help answer the question of just what powers are the powers of local self-
government. In the absence of clear and precise language, the Ohio su-
preme court inherits the obligation to make the determination on a case
by case basis, hopefully with some consistency and upon articulated policy
guidelines; this the court has begun to do in recent years.
Antecedent to recent cases is Bucyrus v. Department of Health of
Ohio4_ involving a challenge by the city of Bucyrus to an order of the state
department of health that the city install satisfactory means for collecting
and disposing of its sewage and that it cease polluting the Sandusky River.
The city challenged the state's authority, arguing that art. 18, § 3, oper-
ated as a limitation on state power. The court rejected this contention,
stating that "[t]he surrender of the sovereignty of the state to the munici-
palities . ..with reference to sanitary regulations, was expressly limited
to such sovereignty as the state itself had not or thereafter has not exer-
cised by the enactment of general laws."401 Thus the court's theory of
decision is firmly grounded in the second clause of art. 18, § 3. The court
used language in support of the policy underlying its decision which has
been applied in subsequent cases which might otherwise have been de-
clared to be governed by the "powers of local self government" clause of
art. 18, § 3, and beyond the state's regulatory authority:
It is a matter of concern to the whole state whether a municipality so
dispose of its sewage as to breed disease within the municipality, for the
municipality is of the public of the state; and it is equally a matter of
concern to the whole state whether a municipality so dispose of its sewage
as to breed disease without and in the vicinity of its own territory, and
whether, having bred disease in either situation, it disseminate it through-
out the state.47
Thus while the holding in Bucyrus, explainable on "police power" grounds,
is not particularly helpful, the rationale for the decision introduces a frank
awareness of the problem of externalities.
Beachwood v. Board of Elections of Cuyahoga County4s developed
more fully the concept of "statewide concern" as a standard for determin-
ing whether or not a municipality was exercising a "power of local self-
government." Beachwood involved the question of whether or not the
procedure which must be followed for the detachment of territory from a
municipality is a subject within a sphere of local self government; the
court answered that question with a dear and emphatic "No":
45 120 Ohio St. 426, 166 N.E. 370 (1929).
46 120 Ohio St. 426,427, 166 N.E. 370 (1929).
47 Id. at 428-29, 166 N.E. at 371 (1929) (emphasis added). If this case were deided today
it is likely that the court would examine the question of whether the statute involved did in fact
meet the West Jefferson standard of "general laws." Sec text accompanying note 43, supra.
48 167 Ohio St. 369, 148 N.E.2d 921 (1958).
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The power of local self government . . . relates solely to the government
and administration of the internal affairs of the municipality .. . . Where
a proceeding ... affects not only the municipality itself but the surround-
ing territory beyond its boundaries, such proceeding is no longer one
which falls within the sphere of local self-government but is one which
must be governed by the general law of the state.49
The test which the court applied was result oriented:
To determine whether legislation is such as falls within the area of
local self-government, the result of such legislation ...must be consid-
ered. If the result affects only the municipality itself, with no extra-lerri.
torial effects the subject is clearly within the power of local self govern-
ment. . . .However, if the result is not so confined it becomes a matter
for the General Assembly.50
The court then proceeded to explain the self-evident proposition that any
change in a municipal boundary is of necessity going to affect the boundary
of a neighboring political subdivision. Here the externality, or extraterri-
torial effect, to use the court's own language, has a tangible, physical im-
pact. As such, Beachwood provided a suitable launching pad for the
"statewide concern" doctrine, but hopefully one which would not be lim-
ited in its application to direct physical externalities.
In 1962 the Ohio supreme court once again utilized the "statewide
concern" doctrine to uphold the regulatory power of the General Assembly
against a challenge that such intervention was precluded by art. 18, § 3.
State ex rel. McElroy v. Akron9 ' upheld Ohio Revised Code § 1547.61 as
a proper exercise of the state's police power. That statute, in addition to
providing for the issuing of state watercraft licenses, contained an explicit
prohibition on any political subdivision of the state attempting to charge
a license fee for watercraft. Quite conceivably the case could have been
decided under the "police power" clause of art. 18, § 3, but the court took
the opportunity to interject the observation that "public recreational facili-
ties have become a matter of statewide concern" and to explain that "many
things which were once considered a matter of purely local concern and
subject strictly to local regulation ... have now become a matter of state-
wide concern, creating the necessity for statewide control." 2
The significance of McElroy is largely symbolic, but it does attest to
the court's continued awareness of the "statewide concern" doctrine and
there is an implied invitation to reassess matters previously determined to
be of strictly local concern. 3  Both Beachwood and McElroy were relied
49 Id. at 371, 148 N.E.2d 921,923 (1958).
5o Id. (emphasis added).
51 173 Ohio St. 189, 181 N.E.2d 26 (1962).
52 Id. at 191-92, 181 N.E.2d at 28 (1962).
53 At least two text writers express doubt about the continuing validity of the state-wide con-
cern doctrine. See J. H. CROWLEY, OHIo MUNICIPAL LAW § 5-14, (1963); J. W, FARRiLL
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upon in Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Painesville in determining the
scope of "the powers of local self government" clause.5 The Painsville
case tested the state's power to regulate intercity electric lines under Ohio
Revised Code § 4905.65 in light of the municipality's claim that it had ex-
clusive jurisdiction over the subject because it was a matter of "local self-
government." The supreme court quoted the "extraterritorial effects" test
of Beachwood and concluded that, in the spirit of McElroy, the regulation
of electric transmission lines has now "become a matter of statewide con-
cern, creating the necessity for statewide control."1 While the Cleveland
case might be explainable on principles similar to those underlying the com-
merce clause-the transmission lines carried power through Painesville to
communities beyond its borders-the court nevertheless felt it appropriate
to quote from the aforementioned cases, emphasizing the externalities
concept.
Most recently, in Willoughby Hills v. Corrigan"' the supreme court
once again invoked the concept of statewide concern in upholding Ohio
Revised Code § 4563.03, which provides for the establishment of multi-
county airport zoning authorities. The village of Willoughby Hills chal-
lenged the state's power to zone land within its borders as a violation of
art. 18, § 3, of the Ohio constitution. While noting that it need not de-
cide the question because of evidentiary inadequacy in the trial record, the
court did state that "[t]he Constitution does not preclude state action on
matters of state concern, and we agree with the holding of the trial court
that the safety and welfare of persons above and on the ground in the
vicinity of modern day airports is a matter of state concern." j7  Willough-
by Hills is particularly important because it alone of the cases thus far dis-
cussed involved zoning.
VIII. IN CONCLUSION:
THE CHALLENGE TO THE LEGISLATURE
This series of cases suggests that if the Ohio supreme court is properly
made aware of the externalities involved in exclusionary zoning, it has ade-
quate precedent to uphold statewide intervention in what has heretofore
been thought of as a matter of strictly local concern. A sufficiently per-
suasive case can be made for treating exclusionary zoning practices as with-
in the "statewide concern doctrine" and the legislature ought not to be
intimidated by fears of unconstitutionality when asked to adopt remedial
measures for dealing with exclusionary zoning. Thus, while the home
and W. H. ELS.., Ti LAW GovERNING MuNIcIPAL CoRpoRA'oNs IN Ono § 1.26 (llth
ed. 1962).
54 15 Ohio St. 2d 125,239 N.E.2d 75 (1968).
55Id. at 129, 239 N.E.2d at 78 (1968).
56 29 Ohio St. 2d 39,278 N.E.2d 658 (1972).
57 Id. at 51, 278 N.E.2d at 665 (1972).
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rule power has contributed to the growth of exclusionary zoning practices,
it has not placed this subject beyond the reach of the Ohio legislature.
The ambiguities of Ohio home rule law may not encourage direct legisla-
tive intervention, but the seriousness of the problem ought to provide suf-
ficient reason for a good faith legislative attempt at finding a suitable
remedy.

